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1 Introduction
In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent in many contexts that, in
addition to the conventional returns to education that ￿ ow from a standard
Mincerian wage equation, there are additional returns that stem from the sig-
nals furnished by diplomas.1;2 Such ￿sheepskin￿ e⁄ects, and any inter-ethnic
di⁄erences in these e⁄ects that may obtain, have been justi￿ed on the basis of
at least two approaches. On the one hand, the theory of statistical discrimi-
nation, as initially proposed by E. Phelps and subsequently developed by D.
Aigner and G. Cain, S. Lundberg and R. Startz, as well as by G. Oettinger,
1The data used in this paper were kindly provided by the Secretariate of State for Employ-
ment of the state government of Bahia. We thank Paulo Henrique de Almeida for facilitating
our access to the data, as well as the Instituto de Saœde Coletiva at UFBA for ￿nancial sup-
port. We thank three anonymous referees and the editor for comments which signi￿cantly
improved the paper. Any sins of omission or commission are our own.
2See Thomas Hungerford and Gary Solon, ￿Sheepskin E⁄ects in the Returns to Education,￿
Review of Economics and Statistics 69 (February 1987):175-178; Dale Belman and John S.
Heywood, ￿Sheepskin E⁄ects in the Returns to Education: An Examination of Women and
Minorities,￿Review of Economics and Statistics 73 (November 1991):720-724; David A. Jaeger
and Marianne E. Page, ￿Degrees Matter: New Evidence on Sheepskin E⁄ects in the Returns
to Education,￿ Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (November 1996):733-739; Harry A.
Patrinos, ￿Non-linearities in the Returns to Education: Sheepskin E⁄ects or Threshold Levels
of Human Capital,￿Applied Economic Letters 3 (March 1996): 171-173; Jin H. Park, ￿Esti-
mation of Sheepskin E⁄ects Using the Old and the New Measures of Educational Attainment
in the Current Population Survey,￿ Economics Letters 62 (February 1999):237-240; Jeremy
Arke, ￿What Do Educational Credentials Signal and Why Do Employers Value Credentials?￿
Economics of Educational Review 18 (February 1999):133-141.
1assumes that the signal furnished by a given level of education is less precise for
the minority group (because exams may favor the majority group).3 In such a
case, for an individual of a given skill, income will be greater for the minority
group at low levels of education, whereas the opposite will be true at higher
levels of education. On the other hand, authors such as D. Golbe or D. Belman
and J. S. Heywood interpret ￿sheepskin￿e⁄ects in terms of a simple signaling
model in the tradition of Spence.4 By assuming that the cost of a high level sig-
nal (college education, for example) is greater for the minority group, it follows
that members of the minority who choose to pursue their studies will bene￿t
from a higher level of remuneration than the majority group. If the implications
of these two approaches in terms of the inter-ethnic pattern of sheepskin e⁄ects
that one should observe are opposite, in both cases imperfect information leads
to inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the returns to schooling.5 In addition, under cer-
tain conditions, imperfect information may result in group discrimination, to
whit, di⁄erent average earnings by ethnic group.6
The purpose of this paper is to examine inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the returns
to education for the three main ethnic groups in the Metropolitan Region of
Salvador (MRS), Bahia state, in Northeastern Brazil, and to ascertain whether
their pattern is consistent with a simple model based on asymmetric information.
In particular, we show that it is possible to explain the observed pattern of
inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the returns to education in Northeastern Brazil with
a model of statistical discrimination that builds on the work of S. Lundberg and
R. Startz and incorporates di⁄erences in the cost of acquiring an education that
is usually associated with a signaling model.7
In addition to traditional sheepskin e⁄ects associated with the completion of
primary, secondary or university education, we focus on the potential signal fur-
nished by admission to university, which is likely to be a very powerful indicator
available to employers because of the selectivity of the university entrance exam
in the state of Bahia, known as the ￿vestibular￿in Portuguese.8 The contrast
3See Edmund Phelps, ￿The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,￿ American Eco-
nomic Review 62 (September 1972):659-661; Dennis Aigner and Glen Cain, ￿Statistical The-
ories of Discrimination in Labor Markets,￿Industrial and Labor Relations Review 30 (January
1977):175-187; Shelly Lundberg and Richard Startz, ￿Private Discrimination and Social Inter-
vention in Competitive Labor Markets,￿American Economic Review 73 (June 1983):340-347;
Gerald S. Oettinger, ￿Statistical Discrimination and the Early Career Evolution of the Black-
White Wage Gap,￿Journal of Labor Economics 14 (January 1996):52-78.
4Devral L. Golbe, ￿Imperfect Signaling, A¢ rmative Action, and Black-White Di⁄eren-
tials,￿Southern Economic Journal 51 (April 1985):842-848; Dale Belman and John S. Hey-
wood, ￿Sheepskin E⁄ects in the Returns to Education: An Examination of Women and Mi-
norities.￿ The seminal paper is of course that by Michael Spence, ￿Job Market Signaling,￿
Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (March 1973):355-374.
5An excellent survey of this literature is provided by Glen Cain, ￿The Economic Analysis of
Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey,￿chapter 13 in eds. Orley Ashenfelter, and Richard
Layard, Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume I (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986).
6On the conditions under which group discrimination obtains, see particularly Lundenberg
and Startz, Ibid, and Oettinger, Ibid.
7Lundberg and Startz, Ibid.
8The vestibular, as in vestibule or entrance in English, is a university entrance exam that
was created in 1910.
2between the accuracy of the signal furnished by "conventional" educational at-
tainment, which is widely perceived as being lower for blacks than for whites
for all years of schooling except for university admission, and the contrasting,
but widely-held, perception that university admission is a more accurate signal
of true productivity for blacks than for whites, constitutes the analytical crux
of our paper.
The main empirical results of this paper are as follows. First, admission to
university yields a return of 141 percent for blacks whereas the corresponding
￿gures for whites and individuals of mixed race are 51:81 and 74:40 percent,
respectively. Second, having completed primary, secondary or a four year uni-
versity degree yields a rate of return of 23:03, 75:00 and 48:62 percent, respec-
tively, for whites, while the corresponding rates of return are 5:19, 24:78 and
￿4:33 for blacks (note that the ￿rst and last of these numbers are not statisti-
cally di⁄erent from zero). As we show in the paper, this pattern of inter-ethnic
di⁄erences in the returns to these levels of educational attainment are consistent
with a theoretical model that focuses on inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the perceived
accuracy of di⁄erent educational signals.
There are at least three reasons that suggest a broader interest of our re-
sults, outside the simple estimation of Mincerian wage equations. First, while
non-linearities in the returns to education have been suggested in the Brazil-
ian context, especially in work by D. Lam and R. Schoeni, and by J. Strauss
and D. Thomas, there has been no attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to
consider inter-ethnic di⁄erences in sheepskin e⁄ects.9 This is surprising given
that, in terms of resource allocation geared toward reducing income inequality,
it is extremely important to be able to identify any inter-ethnic di⁄erences in
educational returns, which in turn feed into broader measures of inequality.
Second, and though this has long been brushed under the rug by appeals
to the theory of racial democracy initially proposed in the celebrated work of
G. Freyre, racial discrimination is today a topic of hot debate in Brazil, at
least in the social sciences outside of economics.10 Most observers agree that
there is a ￿color hierarchy￿in Brazil and that, the darker one￿ s skin tone, the
greater the barriers in the way of social advancement. However, surprisingly
9David Lam and Robert F. Schoeni, ￿E⁄ects of Family Background on Earnings and Re-
turns to Schooling: Evidence from Brazil,￿Journal of Political Economy 101 (April 1993):710-
740; John Strauss and Duncan Thomas, ￿Wages, Schooling, and Background: Investments in
Men and Women in Urban Brazil, in ed. Nancy Birdsall and Richard H. Sabot, Opportunity
Foregone: Education, Growth, and Inequality in Brazil (Washington, DC: Inter-American
Development Bank, 1996).
10Gilberto, Freyre, ￿Casa-Grande e Senzala: Forma￿ªo da Fam￿lia Brasileira sob o Regime
Patriarcal￿(The Master and the Slaves), Bras￿lia (1963): Universidade de Bras￿lia (12th ed.).
For a discussion of racial discrimination, see for example Carlos A. Hasenbalg and Nelson do
Valle Silva, ￿Rela￿ıes Raciais no Brasil Contempor￿neo￿(Racial Relations in Contemporary
Brazil) (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo Ed./Iuperj, 1992); Thomas E. Skidmore, ￿Fact and Myth:
Discovering a Racial Problem in Brazil,￿Working paper #113 (April 1992), Kellogg Institute,
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana; Lucina Jaccoud and Natalie Beghin, ￿De-
sigualdades Raciais no Brasil, um Balan￿o da Interven￿ªo Governmental￿(Racial Inequalities
in Brazil, an Evaluation of Government Intervention), IPEA (2002).
3little attention has been devoted to the question in the economics literature.11
Our paper therefore throws a bridge between the economics literature and the
results from other disciplines, and largely corroborates the widespread feeling
that there is discrimination in the Brazilian labor market, which stems from
persistent racial prejudice.12
Third, our results lead one to the question of how such racial inequalities
can be e⁄ectively combated. In particular, if discrimination is the fruit of racial
prejudice, policies aimed at heightening the feelings of self-worth of groups that
su⁄er from discrimination are likely to be more e⁄ective than a¢ rmative action
campaigns or measures of a more repressive nature.13
2 A simple asymmetric information model of
the labor market in the Brazilian Nordeste
2.1 Two stylized facts and a simple model
The pattern of discrimination that obtains in the Brazilian Nordeste suggests
that a model yielding statistical discrimination would be the most appropriate,
although Brazilian particularities, such as inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the relative
costs of and bene￿ts to a given level of education must also be taken into account.
Two important stylized facts stand out concerning the Brazilian educational
system in general, and the educational system of the MRS in particular. First,
school quality, especially for blacks, is generally believed to be extremely het-
erogeneous, and is perceived by employers as furnishing a relatively inaccurate
signal concerning an individual￿ s true productivity. Second, and in contrast to
the formal schooling system, the vestibular university entrance examination is
widely regarded as being extremely selective and is seen by most employers as
being a very accurate measure of an individual￿ s ability. This is particularly
true for blacks, who constitute a tiny minority of university students, especially
at the more selective public universities.
In order to be able to take employer perceptions, as well as individual edu-
cational investment decisions, into account simultaneously, we consider a simple
model in the tradition of S. Lundberg and R. Startz, which we shall modify in
11Sergei Soares, ￿Per￿l da Discrimina￿ªo no Mercado de Trabalho ￿Homens Negros, Mul-
heres Brancas e Mulheres Negras￿ (A pro￿le of Labor Market Discrimination -Black Men,
White Women and Black Women), IPEA, Texto para Discussªo no 769 (2000); Ricardo Hen-
riques, ￿Desigualdade Racial no Brasil: Evolu￿ªo das Condi￿ıes de Vida na DØcada de 90￿
(Racial Inequality in Brazil: the Evolution of Living Conditions during the 90s), IPEA, Texto
para Discussªo no. 807 (2001).
12HØlio Santos, ￿Discrimina￿ªo Racial no Brasil￿ (Racial Discrimination in Brazil). In
Gilberto Vergne Sab￿ia e Samuel Pinheiro Guimarªes (orgs.), Anais de SeminÆrios Regionais
Preparat￿rios para a ConferŒncia Mundial contra o Racismo, Discrimina￿ªo Racial, Xeno-
fobia e Intoler￿ncia Correlata, Bras￿lia: MinistØrio da Justi￿a (2001).
13Lucina Jaccoud and Natalie Beghin, Ibid; Joaze Bernardino, ￿A￿ªo A￿rmativa e a Redis-
cussªo do Mito da Democracia Racial no Brasil￿ (A¢ rmative Action and the Re-discussion
of the Brazilian Racial Democracy Myth [sic]), Estudos Afro-Asiaticos 24 (February 2002):
247-273.
4order to account for Brazilian speci￿cities.14 Let ￿ be the marginal productiv-
ity of a worker, a her innate ability, and h her level of ability acquired through
education. We pose ￿ = a + bh, where b is a parameter. The cost of acquiring
ability through education is given by ch
2
2 , where c is a parameter. The employer
observes neither the marginal productivity ￿ of the employee, nor her level of
acquired ability h. Rather, she observes a signal ￿, usually understood to be
the number of years of completed schooling, which is assumed to be correlated
with the marginal productivity of the worker. This is posed as:
￿ = ￿ + "; (1)
where (a;") are assumed to be random variables distributed according to the
bivariate normal density function. For simplicity, it will be assumed that the
correlation between a and " is zero (￿(a;") = 0), although this does not a⁄ect
the qualitative ￿ avor of the ensuing results. Formally speaking, the assumption




In what follows, we shall refer to " as the ￿noise￿in the signal. The standard
solution approach used in such models involves the undetermined coe¢ cients
method (used traditionally in the rational expectations literature), and allows














is the correlation between the worker￿ s innate ability a and the noise ". Intu-
itively, the perception of the accuracy of the signal furnished by a given level of
educational attainment ￿ is inversely related to ￿. In terms of individual edu-
cational investment, the model also allows one to solve for the worker￿ s optimal
level of ability acquired through education as:
h￿ =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿ b
c
; (5)
whereas the equilibrium marginal productivity of a worker is given by:
￿






The implications of this model as set out in equations (3) and (5) are clear.
Equation (3) shows that the expected salary will be a weighted average of the
14Lundberg and Startz, Ibid.
15The formal derivation of the model is relegated to the Appendix.
5signal furnished by the potential employee (￿) and the average productivity of
the underlying population (￿￿). The weight associated with the signal is an
increasing function of the latter￿ s precision; that is, the smaller ￿2, the greater
the weight given to the signal. Equation (5) shows that h￿ will be an increasing
function of the precision of the signal, although it will also depend upon the
relative costs and bene￿ts to investment in education (b=c).
To what extent can such a model be used to explain the group-level discrim-
ination that would appear to be such a pervasive feature of the Brazilian labor
market, while assuming that the distribution of innate ability a is the same in
each ethnic group? More importantly, does such a model allow one to formu-
late testable hypotheses that would ￿ ow from the two stylized facts mentioned
above?
Equations (3) and (5) show that there are three parameters, b; c and ￿2 (and
which are likely to be speci￿c to each ethnic group), that can a⁄ect the average
level of remuneration of a given ethnic group as well as the returns to a given
level of the educational signal. Consider two ethnic groups, white and black.














>From (7), it is clear that the slopes of the wage o⁄er curves will depend
solely on the subjective assessment of a worker￿ s productivity, which in turn is
a function of the perceived accuracy of the signal furnished by a given level of
educational attainment (1 ￿ ￿2
w and 1 ￿ ￿2
b). In contrast, the intercepts will be
functions not only of the accuracy of the signals, but of the average levels of
educational attainment of the corresponding populations as well (￿￿wand ￿￿b).
2.2 Implications for conventional schooling
Recall that our ￿rst stylized fact concerning employer perceptions of the Brazil-
ian educational system was that the accuracy of the signal furnished by a given
level of educational attainment (with the exception of university admission) is
lower for blacks than for whites. This should not be surprising in that Brazil is
characterized by the coexistence at all levels of education of private and public
institutions of learning, with a great level of decentralization at the primary
level. This leads to the quality, especially of primary education, being largely a
function of municipal income levels, which vary enormously even within a rel-
atively limited geographical area such as the MRS. In terms of our model, this
means that the variance of the noise associated with the signal is greater for




This inequality corresponds to the hypothesis, associated with the work of K.
Arrow, D. Aigner and G. Cain or S. Lundberg and R. Startz, that the signal
furnished by a given level of schooling is less reliable for blacks than for whites
since, by equation (4) and under the hypothesis that both ethnic groups display

















= 1 ￿ ￿2
b: (8)
The marginal returns to a given level of education, as assessed by a wage re-
gression, should therefore be larger for whites than for blacks.
A second point concerns the relative costs and bene￿ts of education, and
should not be confused with the accuracy of the educational signal. Though
private schools are available for the better-o⁄, these are often inaccessible to
Afrobrazilians for lack of means. Moreover, blacks usually reside in poorer
neighborhoods and the average quality of their schooling, because of the decen-
tralized nature of public education, it therefore likely to be lower than that of
whites.17 This means that it is likely that the ratio b=c is speci￿c to each ethnic
group, with blacks facing a lower b=c ratio than whites.
Formally speaking, this implies, by equation (5), that the level of educational
investment by blacks will be lower than for whites. As long as the di⁄erence in
the accuracy of the educational signal between the two ethnic groups does not
overwhelm the di⁄erence in the bene￿t-cost ratio, the implication will be that
the intercept in the wage o⁄er curve will be smaller for blacks than for whites.18
2.3 Implications for university admission
Consider now the signal furnished by admission to university, which depends
upon successful performance in the vestibular entrance examination. Our sec-
ond stylized fact was that the signal furnished to employers by successful admis-
sion to university is generally perceived as being more accurate for blacks than
for whites. As mentioned earlier, the vestibular is widely seen as being highly
selective. In general, only wealthier students coming from better private schools
and expensive vestibular preparatory programs are able to successfully pass it.19
Contrary to the examinations associated with the completion of primary and
secondary school, the vestibular is not speci￿c to the type of school attended
16Kenneth Arrow, ￿Higher Education as a Filter,￿ Journal of Public Economics 2 (July
1973): 193-216; Aigner and Cain, Ibid; Lundberg and Startz, Ibid.
17Jere R. Behrman, Nancy Birdsall and Robert Kaplan, ￿The Quality of Schooling and
Labor Market Outcomes,￿in Birdsall and Sabot, Ibid; Nancy Birdsall and Richard H. Sabot,
￿Education in Brazil: Playing a Bad Hand Badly,￿in Birdsall and Sabot, Ibid.
18Formally speaking, the condition for the intercept of the black wage o⁄er curve to be


























19Lucina Jaccoud and Natalie Beghin, Ibid; David N. Plank, JosØ A. Sobrinho and Antonio
Carlos da Ressurrei￿ao Xavier, ￿Why Brazil Lags Behind in Educational Development￿, in
Birdsall and Sabot, Ibid. Note that the PED data do not allow one to distinguish between
individuals who attended public versus private schools; the same is true in the PNAD data,
except for the 1982 PNAD (which would constitute an alternative, though somewhat dated,
source of data). There is therefore no way to identify di⁄erences in b explicitly in the data.
7by the student. Indeed, while the di¢ culty of the exams corresponding to com-
pletion of primary and secondary school depend on the quality and selectivity
of each school, the di¢ culty of admission to university depends on the type of
university one wishes to attend. It is therefore not surprising that employers in
the MRS consider the vestibular to be a highly accurate measure of the potential
productivity of employees, and that they view this signal as being more accurate
for blacks than for whites. It is interesting to note that this point corresponds
to the argument advanced by G. J. Borjas and M. S. Goldberg, D. Golbe and D.
Belman and J. S. Heywood that the cost of an inaccurate signal is so high that
poor students are perceived as having a higher probability than rich students of
furnishing an accurate signal, through their admission to university.20





implying, for successful entrance into university, that
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"b(vestibular) = 1 ￿ ￿2
b(vestibular)
(9)
The marginal returns to entrance into university should therefore be substan-
tially greater for blacks than for whites, in contrast to what obtains for the other
years of educational attainment.
2.4 Testable hypotheses and implications
Our two stylized facts combined with a simple model of statistical discrimination
lead to the following hypotheses that are testable within the context of a non-
parametric wage equation.
First, the returns to all levels of schooling (apart from university admission)
should be greater for whites than for blacks, with individuals of mixed race
probably lying somewhere in between.21 Second, and in contrast to other years
of education, the returns to university admission should be greater for blacks
than for whites. Third, given that university admission is considered to be an
extremely accurate measure of true ability, in contrast to other schooling years,
the returns to university admission should be greater than the returns to other
years of schooling, irrespective of ethnic group. Moreover, this di⁄erence should
be particularly pronounced for blacks. These three hypotheses are illustrated
in stylized form in Figure 1.
Note that the potential reversal in the relative returns to education between
blacks and whites that should occur solely for university admission constitutes
a test of statistical versus taste discrimination. If the latter constituted an
accurate characterization of the Brazilian labor market, such a reversal should
20Borjas and Goldberg, Ibid; Golbe, Ibid; Belman and Heywood, Ibid.
21We treat blacks and ￿browns￿separately in order to be in accordance with the widespread
belief that ￿browns￿occupy a more privileged position than do blacks (see Skidmore, Ibid).
8Figure 1: An illustration of the theoretical model
not occur. Similarly, this prediction of our theoretical model also constitutes a
test of conventional human capital theory. If successful passage of the vestibular
was simply an additional year of schooling such as any other, and did not furnish
a signal that is subjectively interpreted by employers, one would expect, given
that whites attend better schools than blacks, to see a higher cumulative return
to this year of education for whites than for blacks (the cumulative return simply
corresponds to the exponential transformation of the coe¢ cient associated with
the 12th year of completed education in the non-parametric wage regression).
3 Empirical results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
The data originate with the Pesquisa Emprego-Desemprego (PED) survey, ad-
ministered by the Department of Economics of the Federal University of Bahia
for the Secretariat of State for Employment of the state government of Bahia.
Our sample refers to wage earning males between 15 and 65 years of age over
the 1996 ￿ 1998 period who inhabited the Metropolitan Region of Salvador.22
22Various age criteria in sample selection were tried. The empirical results that follow do
not vary appreciably when this selection criterion is changed. Given that family background
variables are not available in the survey, it is not possible, unfortunately, to carry out the usual
corrections for sample selection bias. This problem a⁄ects existing US estimates of sheepskin
9Table 1 provides, by ethnic group, summary statistics on the variables that will
be used in the empirical work, including details on the distribution of educa-
tional attainment by years of completed schooling, job tenure in the current job
(in months), and age.23
Note that the PED educational attainment variable used in our study refers
to completed years of education, not the number of years the individual has been
in school. That is, an individual who has taken 10 years to reach satisfactory
completion of the 8th year of the primary educational system is classi￿ed as
having completed 8 years of education. In terms of identifying sheepskin e⁄ects
per se, the PED measure is therefore more satisfactory than the number of
years of schooling variable in US data used by T. Hungerford and G. Solon
or D. Belman and J. S. Heywood.24 On the other hand, true identi￿cation of
sheepskin e⁄ects, and distinguishing them from the returns to education, would
require data on actual diplomas received and the amount of time spent in school.
As J. H. Park puts it: ￿... a stronger test would be to compare the earnings
of those who have the degree and those who do not conditional on both groups
having the same number of years of schooling￿ .25
Sheepskin e⁄ects in the Brazilian educational system should obtain for three
values of completed years of schooling: eight (primary school), eleven (high-
school), and ￿fteen (basic college degree). Given our hypothesis concerning the
e⁄ects, which also do not control for sample selection issues. Note that existing estimates of
sheepskin e⁄ects in the US are based on samples of wage earners of between 25 and 64 years
of age. Given Brazilian demographics, restricting one￿ s attention to individuals older than 25
would substantially restrict our sample. Finally, note that the period in question followed the
successful Real stabilization plan. Results do not change signi￿cantly when results are based
on hourly wages expressed in US dollars, using either the o¢ cial or black market (paralelo)
exchange rate.
23The de￿nition of an ethnic group in Brazil is fraught with di¢ culties. In particular, there
is a bewilderingly large number of terms that are used to refer to a person￿ s ethnic origin
or skin color. Peggy A. Lovell, ￿Development and Persistence of Racial Inequality in Brazil:
1950-1991,￿ Journal of Developing Areas 33 (spring 1999):395-417, who provides a useful
summary of the current state of the literature, notes that a study by Moreno do Valle Silva,
￿Morenidade: Modo de Usar￿ (Being Brown: A User￿ s Guide), Estudos Afro-AsiÆticos 30
(March 1996):79-95, ￿nds that only 57 percent of individuals faced with an open question
in terms of their color classify themselves into one of the three groups referred to here. On
the other hand, when faced with a closed question expressed in terms of the three above-
mentioned groups, all individuals are able and (more or less) willing to classify themselves. It
is also important to note that the bipolar classi￿cation into whites and non-whites has been
widely criticized in Brazil as being inappropriate and based on American stereotypes. In the
Bahian data, moreover, the distinction between mixed and black groups would appear to be
important (in particular with respect to inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the impact of university
admission ￿ see below). In the PED questionnaire, the relevant question is phrased in closed
form and therefore classi￿cation into one of the three ethnic groups is not problematic. For
purposes of comparison, we include results based on a bipolar classi￿cation in which the black
and mixed categories are grouped together into an Afrobrazilian category. A fourth ethnic
group constituted by individuals of Asian extraction was dropped as it comprised only ￿ve
individuals.
24Hungerford and Solon, Ibid; Belman and Heywood, Ibid.
25Park, Ibid; Jaeger and Page, Ibid; Thomas J. Kane and Cecilia Rouse. ￿Labor Market
Returns to Two- And Four-Year College: Is a Credit a Credit and Do Degrees Matter?￿
American Economic Review 83 (January 1993): 600-613 for the identi￿cation of sheepskin
e⁄ects in US data using information on degrees and time in school.
10signal furnished by admission to university another important sheepskin e⁄ect
should obtain for twelve years of completed education.26
Figure 2 presents the cumulative density function of the logarithm of the
hourly wage for our sample, by ethnic group.As should be obvious from the
Figure 2: Cumulative densities of log hourly wage, by ethnic group
Figure, there is a clear shift to the right of the respective cumulative densities
(as in ￿rst order stochastic dominance) as one moves from black, to the mixed,
to the white ethnic group.
3.2 Nonparametric evidence
Table 2 displays the private rate of return to an additional year of schooling,
as assessed by a semi-log wage equation where we control for job tenure (in
months) and experience. These results are based on a speci￿cation in which
educational attainment enters in non-parametric form, that is with a dummy
26The educational system in Brazil is composed of three levels: ￿fundamental￿education,
secondary education (educa￿ªo mØdia) and university. The ￿rst level comprises eight years of
education for children from ages 7 to 14, while secondary education lasts 3 years for young-
sters aged between 15 and 17. Finally, higher education, which begins once an individual
has successfully passed the vestibular, may be decomposed into two levels: the ￿rst level,
corresponding to undergraduate students, which lasts from three to six years depending upon
the subject matter, and the second level, corresponding to graduates. The latter are usually
students who are pursuing a masters or a doctoral degree while simultaneously holding a job,
preferably in the public sector (they are then considered to be employed).
11variable for each year of completed schooling, estimated on the full sample with
ethnic-speci￿c coe¢ cients for each explanatory variable.27 The econometric
estimation that lie behind these results are summarized in Table 4.28 In Table
3, we present results corresponding to pairwise comparisons of the returns to
an additional year of education, by ethnic group. Two characteristics clearly
distinguish the white group from the mixed and black groups.
First, as expected, there are high peaks for whites associated with the re-
turns to the three traditional values of completed years of schooling (8, 11 and
15). These returns, which are equal respectively to 22:8, 74:0 and 47:2 percent,
may be in part associated with "conventional" sheepskin e⁄ects insofar as the
intermediate (non ￿degree￿ ) years of schooling do not display such high rates
of return.29 The magnitude of these returns decreases as one moves from the
white, to the mixed, to the black ethnic group. Indeed, while the rates of return
associated with completion of primary and high school are equal to 15:4 and
37:6 percent for mixed group, blacks display a rate of return equal to 24 percent
for the completion of the high school but do not have statistically signi￿cant
sheepskin e⁄ect associated with completing primary school. Finally, whereas
the return to completing a four-year university degree (15 years of completed
education) is particularly important for whites, it is marginally so for individuals
of mixed race and not at all so for blacks. Note however that the rate of return
to completing university is less easy to interpret insofar as course programs may
last from a minimum of three to a maximum of six years.
The statistical tests for di⁄erences in the magnitudes of sheepskin e⁄ects by
ethnic group, presented in Table 3, con￿rm the initial impressions gleaned from
Table 2 and allow for a more formal test of the hypothesis advanced earlier.
First, sheepskin e⁄ects associated with the completion of primary school are
27Before settling on the non-parametric speci￿cation used in the paper, we ￿rst estimated
a traditional Mincerian equation in which the returns to schooling were linear for each ethnic
group. The results con￿rmed that the earnings pro￿les by ethnic group had a pattern roughly
consistent with that shown in Figure 1, to whit (i) returns to schooling and (ii) a constant
which are greater for whites than for individuals of mixed race or blacks. The respective rates
of return were equal to 12:7, 15:32 and 19:56 percent for blacks, mixed and whites. Note that
the assumption of linearity was rejected. Next, we adopted the standard spline speci￿cation
which restricts the rates of return to be linear within each educational level (primary, secondary
and university) and allows for sheepskin e⁄ects associated with admission to university as well
as for the three years of education corresponding to the completion of primary, secondary and
university education. These sheepskin e⁄ects are allowed for by including dummies variables
for each of these completed years of education (education ￿ 8, 11, 12 and 15). The linearity
assumption (by level of schooling) of the earnings pro￿les having again been strongly rejected,
we adopted the non-parametric speci￿cation presented in the paper.
28Given that the coe¢ cients associated with the educational attainment variables are large,
we compute the rate of return to the nth year of schooling as expf￿n ￿ ￿n￿1g ￿ 1, where ￿n
is the regression coe¢ cient associated with nyears of completed schooling. Taking the rate of
return as being simply equal to the di⁄erence in coe¢ cients is only valid for small values of
￿n.
29It should also be kept in mind that these peaks in the earnings pro￿le may be the result of
selectivity bias. This would be the case if there were a positive correlation between schooling
and the marginal return to schooling. See David Card, ￿The Causal E⁄ect of Education on
Earnings,￿ in eds. Orley Ashenfelter, and Richard Layard, Handbook of Labor Economics,
Volume 3A (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999): 1800-1863.
12signi￿cantly larger for whites and individuals of mixed race than they are for
blacks (recall that no statistically signi￿cant primary school sheepskin e⁄ect
obtained for blacks).
Second, sheepskin e⁄ects associated with the completion of secondary school
are signi￿cantly smaller for blacks than for the two other ethnic groups. Con-
comitantly, the sheepskin e⁄ect associated with completion of a four-year uni-
versity diploma is greater for whites than it is for the two other ethnic groups,
but is not statistically signi￿cant in the black-white comparison because of the
large estimated standard error associated with the black university sheepskin.
Third, for blacks, the highest peak in the earnings pro￿le is associated with
successful admission to university, which re￿ ects having successfully passed the
vestibular exam. The rate of return for the twelfth year of completed education
is equal to an impressive 141 percent for blacks. This is an exceptionally high
number by any standard. For whites and individuals of mixed race, on the other
hand, the university admission e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant but its magnitude
is respectively one third and one half of what it is for blacks. Thus, our tests
con￿rm our results that there are statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences between
the white group and the black group in the rate of return to the twelfth year of
completed schooling.
This last result is consistent with Kenneth Arrow￿ s hypothesis that admission
to university constitutes an important screen.30 It is also consistent with the
commonly accepted view in the social science literature which holds that blacks
su⁄er from racial prejudice rather than ￿taste￿discrimination, with employers
being willing to pay a higher salary for blacks who are able to demonstrate their
potential productivity.31 Note that the cumulative return to twelve years of
completed education is greater for blacks than for whites. This clearly demon-
strates that education plays the role of a signal of individual productivity in
that, given the higher quality schools that whites generally attend, their level of
acquired ability should be higher than that of blacks. Our results are therefore
not, a priori, compatible with a simple human capital explanation.
Note also that for blacks, the rate of return associated with completion of
the ￿rst year of secondary education is particularly high compared to that which
obtains for completion of primary school. This result means that completion
of primary school is not considered to be a precise signal for blacks. In this
case, having successfully entered secondary school may have an e⁄ect similar to
that associated with admission to university. However, there are no signi￿cant
di⁄erences in this rate of return by ethnic group.
Our main ￿ndings can therefore be summarized as follows:
(i) the returns to the 8th , 11th and 15th completed year of education is
signi￿cantly greater for whites than it is for individuals of mixed race or blacks;
(ii) the returns to the 12th year of completed education (admission to uni-
versity as indicated by the successful completion of the ￿rst year) is signi￿cantly
greater for blacks than it is for non-blacks.
30Arrow, Ibid.
31Skidmore, Ibid. See also Hasenbalg and Silva, Ibid.
13(iii) for the blacks, the returns to the 12thyear of completed education are
signi￿cantly greater than the returns to completing 8, 11 or 15 years.
The extremely high rate of return to admission to university for individuals of
mixed race and blacks probably re￿ ects in part conventional returns to education
in that a considerable amount of academic work goes into the preparation of the
vestibular university admission exam. However, it is likely that it is the result
of a sheepskin-like signal insofar as there is no other reason that would lead to
such large inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the rate of return to what is a relatively
homogeneous exam.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our empirical results suggest that it is the admission of blacks to university that
yields a comparatively large return, whereas it is the completion of a degree
(be it school or university) that counts for whites, with individuals of mixed
extraction lying somewhere in between.
Our model of statistical discrimination based on di⁄erences in the perception
of the precision of the signal precision and on the relative costs and bene￿ts
to education explain these striking inter-ethnic di⁄erences in the returns to
education in the MRS.
There is currently a debate in Brazil concerning a¢ rmative action programs,
with the suggestion of quotas for Afrobrazilians in the public sector and in
some state universities. These policies, the object of which is to democratize
university education and to reduce racial inequalities, are highly controversial.
In particular, they run counter to the principle that admittance to an institution
of learning be based on merit alone. They will also be e¢ cient only if they
are permanent: this violates the fundamental principle of a¢ rmative action
programs.32 Concomitantly, however, alternatives measures such as policies
supporting pre-vestibular programs (the cost of which is prohibitive for most
Brazilians) have been put in place in order to encourage low-income Brazilians
to enter university. In light of our results, this may indeed be a manner of
facilitating the access of Afrobrazilians to higher education, and of remedying
the de￿ciencies in the public educational system at the primary and secondary
levels, without impugning merit-based access to university. Our results also
suggest that much e⁄ort needs to be made in order to improve the quality of
public schools particularly in those neighborhoods inhabited by Afrobrazilians.
32See Antonio Guimarªes and Sergio Alfredo, ￿Measures to Combat Discrimination and
Racial Inequality in Brazil,￿in Rebecca Reichman, ed. Race in Contemporary Brazil: From
Indi⁄erence to Inequality (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999);
and Bernardino, Ibid. For a theoretical approach, see for example Stephen Coate and Glenn
Loury, ￿Will A¢ rmative Action Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?￿The American Economic
Review 83 (December 1993): 1220-40.
145 Appendix: derivation of the theoretical model
of statistical discrimination applied to the Brazil-
ian Nordeste
To apply the undetermined coe¢ cients method, we write:
h = ￿0 + ￿aa + ￿"":
The ￿rm sets its wage on the basis of the expected marginal productivity of the
worker, conditional on the signal ￿:
w = E[￿j￿] = E[￿ ￿ "j￿] = ￿ ￿ E["j￿]:
Note that one can write the signal as:
￿ = ￿ + " = a + bh | {z }
￿
+ " = a + b(￿0 + ￿aa + ￿"")
| {z }
h | {z }
￿
+ ";
which by substitution can be rewritten as:
￿ = a + b(￿0 + ￿aa + ￿"") + "
= b￿0 + (1 + b￿a)a + (1 + b￿")":
Since (a;") ￿ N(￿a;￿";￿2
a;￿2
";0), the signal is distributed according to the
(univariate) normal density function with mean:
￿￿ = E[￿] = b￿0 + (1 + b￿a)￿a + (1 + b￿")￿";
and variance:
￿2
￿ = var[￿] = (1 + b￿a)2￿2
a + (1 + b￿")2￿2
":
Concomitantly, the signal ￿ and the noise " are jointly distributed according to
the bivariate normal density with means (￿￿;￿") and variances (￿2
￿;￿2
"). The
covariance between the signal and the noise is given by:
cov[￿;"] = E[(b￿0 + (1 + b￿a)a + (1 + b￿")")"] ￿ ￿￿￿"
which can be expressed as:
cov[￿;"] = [b￿0 + (1 + b￿a)￿a ￿ ￿￿]￿" + (1 + b￿")￿2
" + (1 + b￿")￿2
":
Since
￿￿ = b￿0 + (1 + b￿a)￿a + (1 + b￿")￿";
it follows that
b￿0 + (1 + b￿a)￿a = ￿￿ ￿ (1 + b￿")￿":
15Substitution then yields:
cov[￿;"] = (1 + b￿")￿2
":












We can now compute the expectation of the noise, conditional on the signal:
E["j￿] = ￿"j￿



















Now recall that the employer sets the wage such that: w = ￿￿E["j￿]:Substitution
yields:































(a + bh + ")
| {z }
￿












The First Order Condition is given by:
￿






b ￿ ch￿ = 0;
16allowing one to write:
h￿ =
￿









Since the level of investment in human capital is non-stochastic, one then sets
























This corresponds to equation (5) in the text. In equilibrium the ￿rm￿ s wage














































which corresponds to equation (3) in the text. Moreover, the equilibrium mar-
ginal productivity of a worker is given by:
￿











which corresponds to equation (6) in the text.
17Full Afro
sample White Mixed Black Brazilians
Number of observations 17;449 3;236 9;993 4;220 14;213
(% of sample) (100:00) (18:53) (57:24) (24:18) (81:47)
Hourly wage in $Reais 0:7531 1:306 0:714 0:419 0:627
(std. deviation) (0:99) (1:11) (0:94) (0:83) (0:92)
Age : mean 32:63 34:12 32:36 32:11 32:29
(std. deviation) (10:85) (11:27) (10:64) (10:92) (10:73)
Job tenure (in months) 62:66 72:26 61:95 56:96 60:47
(std. deviation) (81:95) (89:30) (81:09) (77:35) (80:03)
Educational attainment
Yrs. of completed school. 8:04 10:44 7:91 6:51 7:50
(std. deviation) (4:10) (4:04) (3:94) (3:65) (3:91)
Yrs. of completed school.
number of observations
1 479 37 275 167 442
2 567 48 319 200 519
3 862 81 479 302 781
4 1617 154 932 531 1463
5 1507 133 890 484 1374
6 884 93 548 243 791
7 905 95 536 274 810
8 (primary school) 1785 228 1079 478 1557
9 792 101 496 195 691
10 686 125 408 153 561
11 4515 1013 2675 827 3502
12 (university) 183 89 77 17 94
13 267 119 123 25 148
14 313 131 163 19 182
15 (four-year degree) 1058 519 482 57 539
16 308 156 140 12 152
17 105 62 39 4 43
Table 1: Summary statistics
18Years of completed White [p-value] Mixed [p-value] Black [p-value]
schooling
1 0:0805 0:661 0:0561 0:318 0:1148 0:151
2 ￿0:1915 0:161 0:0368 0:465 ￿0:0245 0:706
3 0:4263 0:024 0:0341 0:451 0:1019 0:079
4 ￿0:0150 0:870 0:0984 0:008 0:0824 0:068
5 0:0199 0:809 0:0066 0:809 0:0603 0:120
6 0:1314 0:208 0:1140 0:000 0:1446 0:003
7 0:0801 0:401 0:1217 0:001 0:1426 0:012
8 0:2303 0:010 0:1551 0:000 0:0510 0:292
9 0:1682 0:058 0:1865 0:000 0:2300 0:000
10 ￿0:0454 0:588 0:0534 0:667 0:0703 0:324
11 0:7500 0:000 0:3778 0:000 0:2478 0:000
12 0:5181 0:000 0:7540 0:000 1:4182 0:000
13 0:0361 0:698 ￿0:0394 0:667 ￿0:0629 0:750
14 0:0329 0:697 0:2573 0:009 0:0741 0:741
15 0:4862 0:000 0:1207 0:098 ￿0:0433 0:825
16 0:3443 0:000 0:3886 0:000 0:0935 0:712
17 ￿0:0953 0:435 ￿0:0974 0:395 ￿0:2468 0:457
Table 2: Rate of return to an additional year of schooling by ethnic group
Years of completed Black White White
schooling ￿Mixed [p-value] ￿Mixed [p-value] ￿Black [p-value]
1 0:0587 0:548 0:0244 0:898 ￿0:0343 0:864
2 ￿0:0613 0:456 ￿0:2283 0:117 ￿0:167 0:270
3 0:0678 0:357 0:3922 0:043 0:3244 0:102
4 ￿0:016 0:782 ￿0:1134 0:263 ￿0:0974 0:354
5 0:0537 0:263 0:0133 0:856 ￿0:0404 0:681
6 0:0306 0:617 0:0174 0:859 ￿0:0132 0:926
7 0:0209 0:760 ￿0:0416 0:675 ￿0:0625 0:565
8 ￿0:1041 0:083 0:0752 0:446 0:1793 0:083
9 0:0435 0:553 ￿0:0183 0:896 ￿0:0618 0:607
10 0:0169 0:846 ￿0:0988 0:294 ￿0:1157 0:290
11 ￿0:13 0:147 0:3722 0:004 0:5022 0:000
12 0:6642 0:124 ￿0:2359 0:198 ￿0:9001 0:035
13 ￿0:0235 0:914 0:0755 0:560 0:099 0:648
14 ￿0:1832 0:454 ￿0:2244 0:086 ￿0:0412 0:867
15 ￿0:164 0:438 0:3655 0:003 0:5295 0:019
16 ￿0:2951 0:271 ￿0:0443 0:714 0:2508 0:341
17 ￿0:1809 0:980 0:0024 0:670 0:1833 0:668
Table 3: Estimated di⁄erences in the rate of return to an additional year of
schooling : pairwise comparisons. by ethnic group
19Full Afro































































































































































































































￿ 0:6622 0:7104 0:6505 0:6252 0:6452
R
2
0:5600 0:5953 0:5272 0:4467 0:5136
Number of obs. 17;449 3;236 9;993 4;220 14;213
Table 4: Wage equations, by ethnic group (t-statistics below coe¢ cients)
20